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Over the last ve decades, the Law and Economics movement has thor-
oughly studied tort rules. It is fair to say that by now the costs and benets
associated with the major rules are well understood and have become ex-
pected knowledge taught worldwide in all of the major Law Schools. What
is less well understood are the e¤ects of di¤erent court procedures and prac-
tices on the outcome of trials and, therefore, their respective impact on the
ex-ante incentives of potential tortfeasors. In particular, divergence of court
procedures across legal systems may well generate for entire classes of prob-
lems very di¤erent outcomes and incentives despite an a-priori use of the
same basic tort rule.
In that respect, the article by Scott Baker (2016) is a welcome endeavor
to understand the relationship between pre-trial dispositive motions, settle-
ments and discovery which are part of procedural rules commonly used in US
courts. The paper starts by a very useful description of the litigation process
under US federal law with an emphasis on the stage of discovery and on mo-
tion of summary judgements by the respective parties. The analysis proceeds
by describing a stylized model designed to capture some of the key features of
the litigation game and analyze settlement o¤ers by defendants. Consistent
with the objective of the paper, the setup presumes the parties have imper-
fect and asymmetric information. Moreover, the legal environment allows
the defendant to le a motion for a summary judgement at di¤erent stages
of the game.
A central element in Bakers model is a divergence between the defendant
and the plainti¤ on their respective evaluation of the impact of information
revealed during the proceeding on the outcome of the trial. In the paper,
this divergence is obtained by imposing two key assumptions which I will
now describe in a slightly more general fashion than in Bakers analysis for
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the environment without discovery and pre-trial dispositive motions.
First, from the parties standpoint, the relevant information a¤ecting the
courts decision is summarized by a random variable x  G(x; z) over the
support [0; 1] where z > 0 denotes the respective parties type. During a
trial x is realized and commonly observed. For a given x, the defendant pays
damage D depending on whether x ? bx where bx is a commonly known value
which is exogenously determined by the legal system.1 Second, from the
point of view of the defendant the plainti¤s type is unknown and perceived
as a random variable z  F (z). Consider the following assumptions;
Assumption 1: G(x; z) = [H(x)]z where H() is a distribution over the
support [0; 1].
Assumption 2: It is common knowledge that z = 1 for the defendant.
Assumption 3: The distribution F (z) is log concave.
Assumptions 1 and 2 generalize Bakers setup in two ways. First, it al-
lows for pessimistic (z < 1) as well as optimistic plainti¤s (z > 1).2 Second,
Baker only considers a very specic quasi uniform distribution.3 More gen-
erally, it should be possible to avoid the specic functional form imposed by
Assumption 1 by requiring that G(x; z) satises MLRP. Assumption 3 is the
same as in Baker.
To keep notation to a minimum and slightly abusing notation, I dene
the ex-ante probability perceived by the defendant that he will win a trial
by bH = H(bx). In contrast, a plainti¤ of type z will expect to win with
probability 1  bHz. Accordingly, the z-type plainti¤ will determine whether
to accept or reject a settlement o¤er s by comparing it to

1  bHzD   cp
where the rst term measures expected damage payments and cp denotes
the plainti¤s court fees. Assuming as in Baker that D is normalized at 1
and letting bz(s; bH) designate the critical plainti¤which is indi¤erent between
accepting the settlement o¤er and going to trial, we obtain:
bz(s; bH) = ln (1  cp   s)
ln bH : (1)
Accordingly, plainti¤s that are more pessimistic than the critical type (i.e.
1For ease of the ensuing notation, I changed the representation of the critical value
from xc to bx.
2Clearly, there is no obvious reason why plainti¤s should be more optimistic than
defendants as in Baker (2017). In fact, in the numerical example presented below the
critical plainti¤ who is just indi¤erent between accepting the optimal settlement o¤er and
going to court turns out to be characterized by z < 1. In the current model means he less
optimistic than the defendant.
3Specically, in Bakers model g(x; z) = xz depending on x 7 1=2 and where z 2 [0; 1]
for plainti¤ and z = 0 for defendants.
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z  bz(s; bH)) will accept s while more optimistic individuals will prefer going
to trial. A rational defendant will predict this behavior. Hence, he will ex-
pect settling with probability F [bz(s; bH)] and going to court otherwise. In the
latter case, he anticipates the legal fees cd and expected damage payment,
1  bH. Hence the defendant can solve for the settlement o¤er which min-
imizes his total expected costs, i.e.
C(s; bH) = s  F [bz(s; bH)] + 1  bH + cd  1  F [bz(s; bH)] : (2)
Dividing the rst-order condition of (2) with respect to s by f [bz(s; bH)], we
nd that the defendants optimal settlement o¤er, s( bH), is implicitly dened
by the solution to the equation:
F
hbz(s; bH)i
f
hbz(s; bH)i  
s 

1  bH  cd
(1  cp   s) ln bH = 0 : (3)
Substituting bz(s; bH) from (1) and taking derivative with respect to s we nd
that the left-hand ratio is increasing in s. Assuming that cd+cp < bH ensures
that the right-hand ratio is decreasing in s. Note that the requirement simply
states that total court fees are less than the defendants expected damage
costs. With appropriate boundary conditions, this veries that the basic
model has a unique solution which concludes the description of the setup
without discovery and pre-trial dispositive motions.
The next step in Bakers analysis is to extend the basic framework by
introducing after a rst rejection of a settlement o¤er a discovery stage
followed by the possibility of a motion for a summary judgment. In case of no
motion or if it is denied, the defendant can make an additional post-discovery
settlement o¤er. Applying backward induction, consider the defendant deci-
sion for a post discovery settlement o¤er.
At that stage, the information revealed during discovery allows all the
parties to update their information. Mathematically, this can be captured
by assuming that the parties perceive x  eG(x; z) = [ eH(x)]z over the support
[0; 1]. Hence, except for the change in the parties information, the problem
remains exactly the same as the one described above. Accordingly, the de-
fendant will make the settlement o¤er s( eH(bx)).
In Bakers analysis, the parties nd out during discovery whether x 2
[0; 1
2
) or x 2 1
2
; 1

. Hence, by updating the parties learn whether the post-
discovery distribution First-Order Stochastically Dominate (FOSD hereafter)
the pre-discovery distribution or whether the reverse holds. In the current
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extension, this can be generalized by assuming that discovery either reveals
that eH() FOSD H() or that the reverse holds.
To fully solve an extended version of Bakers model and determine the de-
fendants pre-discovery settlement o¤er, one would now need to describe the
judges decision rule on a motion of summary judgement and, furthermore,
introduce an assumption over the set of possible post-discovery distributions.4
Clearly, this goes beyond the scope of this short comment. Nevertheless, even
without a full description of the model the setup suggests some straightfor-
ward intuitions.
For instance, consider proposition 2 in Bakers analysis and suppose that
post discovery the judge rejected a motion for a summary judgement in favor
of the defendant. Clearly, one would expect that the information revealed
during discovery was not favorable to the defendant. In the model that I
described, this would suggest eH(bx) < H(bx). Applying the implicit function
theorem to (3) and using the equality s = 1  bHz   cp, we have:
ds
d bH =
bHz  bH+cd+cp+ bH ln bHbH(ln2 bH)(1 cp s)   ddz
h
F (bz)
f(bz)
i
 bzH
Css  f (bz) (4)
By construction, the denominator in (4) must be positive since it is the
second-order condition of a minimization problem. For the general case, the
sign of the numerator in (4) is ambiguous though; d
dz
h
F (z)
f(z)
i
> 0 by Assump-
tion 3 and by (1) bzH =   ln(1 cp s)bH ln2 bH > 0,5 but the sign of the denominator
in the rst fraction remains undetermined unless further conditions are im-
posed. Nevertheless, one would expect the term bHz  bH+ cd+ cp to be fairly
small. For instance, in the Baker analysis, the critical plainti¤ is an optimist
which implies z > 1 in the current version of the model. This would implybHz  bH < 0. Moreover, cd+cp measures the court fees relative to the damage
which has been normalized at D = 1. Hence, cd + cp should relatively small.
Altogether, it seems reasonable that for most cases the rst fraction becomes
negative which would imply ds

d bH < 0.
For the purpose of this comment, I did not search for a condition which
would ensure the suggested conclusion. Instead, I consider a specic example
with F (z) = 1   e z. With all the functions specied, I used Mathematica
to draw the associated s() function represented in the gure below.
4In Bakers environment, this follows by the very restrictive structure of discovery which
either reveals x 2 [0; 12 ) or x 2

1
2 ; 1

and the additional requirement bx 2  12 ; 1.
5Ceteris paribus, information that is more favorable to the defendant implies that more
plainti¤s should accept a given settlement o¤er.
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As one would expect, we nd that after the rejection of a motion for sum-
mary judgement in favor of the defendant, the latter perceives that his case is
poor and increases the settlement o¤er. This suggests that Bakers ndings
of proposition 2 could be extended to a much larger class of environments.
The above logic also suggests a diametrically symmetric nding for the
case where the plainti¤ les for a motion which is rejected by the court.
Finally, intermediary cases where the parties engaged in discovery, but nei-
ther side led for a summary judgement could also be analyzed within this
framework. Altogether, even though the scope of Bakers (2016) ndings may
appear somewhat limited due to fairly restrictive assumptions that have been
imposed to simplify the analysis, I believe that an extension of the model will
verify the generality of the central conclusions and their intuition.
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